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Summary
This article contrasts the Scottish reform of custodial legal assistance introduced
subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cadder with similar developments
in France. It offers a comparative viewpoint for the analysis of criticism directed
atCadder and opens up vistas of possibility for the consideration of further reform.
The article also invites reflection on the significance of the developments in
Scotland and France for custodial legal assistance in England and Wales.1
Introduction
The decision of the Supreme Court in Cadder v HM Advocate2 had profound
consequences for the law of custodial interrogation in Scotland. Applying Salduz
v Turkey3 the Supreme Court held that compatibility with art.6 of the Convention
required that contracting states organise their systems in such a way as to ensure
that “a person who is detained has access to advice from a lawyer before he is
subjected to police questioning”.4 From this it followed that the relevant Scottish
legislation,5 allowing for the detention and questioning of suspects for a period of
up to six hours with no access to legal advice, was the very converse of what is
required by the right to fair trial.6 As a result of Cadder, the Scottish Government
rushed through emergency legislation, recognising suspects’ right to have a private
consultation with a solicitor before any questioning begins and at any other time
during such questioning.7 The legislation also increased the period of detention to
1 I am most grateful to Andrew Choo, Peter Duff, Stewart Field and the anonymous referees for their comments
on previous written versions. Errors that remain are my responsibility.
2Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43; 2010 S.L.T. 1125.
3 Salduz v Turkey (2008) E.H.R.R. 421.
4Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [48].
5 Sections 14 and 15 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
6Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [93].
7Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s.15A(3), as inserted by Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention
and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 s.1(4).
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12 hours,8 with the possibility of extension for another 12 hours.9 Subsequently,
the Justice Secretary appointed Lord Carloway to conduct a review of key elements
of Scottish criminal law and practice (the Carloway Review).10 The Government
has now accepted the broad reasoning as set out in the Carloway Report and is
intending to introduce legislation based around the Report’s recommendations.11
Just as this was happening the Supreme Court has also brought precision to a
number of issues left unresolved by Cadder, in the cases known as “sons of
Cadder”.12
Around the same time as the reforms in Scotland, the Conseil constitutionnel
(Constitutional Council) in France found that most of the provisions of the Code
de procédure pénale (Code of penal procedure) on custodial legal assistance were
in violation of the Constitution. Suspects questioned by the police in the context
of the garde à vue (the detention and questioning of suspected offenders by the
police)13 did not have the benefit of effective assistance from a lawyer and were
not notified of their right to remain silent.14 Salduz figured prominently in the
debates at the Conseil constitutionnel.15 Its decision, along with various decisions
of the Cour de cassation (the French “supreme court”), led to the introduction of
legislation, on April 14, 2011,16 recognising for the first time the right of suspects
to be assisted by a lawyer during questioning. Until then, suspects were only
allowed to have a 30-minute consultation with their lawyer at the beginning of the
garde à vue. Condemnation by the ECtHR a few months earlier, in Brusco v
France,17 had considerably accelerated the reform process, obliging the French
government to overcome its originally reluctant approach to recognising a more
important role for lawyers at the police station.
As expected, Cadder generated considerable scholarly debate, north and south
of the border. In the Edinburgh Law Review, it was described as “one of the most
important, and almost certainly the most controversial, decision handed down
‘from London’”.18 In two articles recently published in the Criminal Law Review,
the authors were critical of the Supreme Court’s decision, inter alia for taking “an
inappropriately narrow view of Scots law”, attempting “an inappropriate
homogenisation of criminal procedure” and “risking a diminution of the rights of
suspects in Scotland”.19 In the more recent article, it was argued that some of the
8Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s.14, as amended by Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention
and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 s.3(1).
9Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s.14A, as inserted by Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention
and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 s.3(2).
10The Carloway Review, Report and Recommendations, November 17, 2011, available at http://www.scotland.gov
.uk/About/Review/CarlowayReview [Accessed February 20, 2013].
11The Scottish Government, Reforming Scots Criminal Law and Practice: The Carloway Report — Scottish
Government Consultation Paper, paras 1.8–1.10, July 2012, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications
/2012/07/4794 [Accessed February 20, 2013].
12Ambrose v Harris [2011] UKSC 43; [2011] 1W.L.R. 2435;HMAdvocate v P [2011] UKSC 44; [2011] 1W.L.R.
2497;McGowan v B [2011] UKSC 54; [2011] 1 W.L.R. 3121; Jude (Raymond) v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 55;
[2012] S.L.T. 75.
13 See art.62-2 CPP (Code de procédure pénale).
14Conseil constitutionnel, Décision n° 2010-14/22 QPC du 30 juillet 2010 at [28].
15See the video recordings of the public audience of July 20, 2010, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel
.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/acces-videos/decisions/2010/affaires-n-2010-14-qpc-et-n-2010-22-qpc.48722
.html [Accessed February 20, 2013].
16Loi n° 2011-392 du 14 avril 2011 relative à la garde à vue.
17Brusco v France, App. no 1466/07 (ECtHR, October 19, 2010) at [45].
18 “Symposium—Cadder v HM Advocate” (2011) 15 Edin. L.R. 275.
19 See R.M. White and P.R. Ferguson, “Sins of the Father? The ‘Sons of Cadder’” [2012] Crim. L.R. 357, 358,
summarising the main suggestions made in an earlier article: P.R. Ferguson, “Repercussions of the Cadder Case: the
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dangers deriving from Cadder now seem to have receded as a result of the “sons
of Cadder” cases, where the Supreme Court was allegedly less adamant about
taking an internationalist and due process orientated approach to custodial
interrogation.20 In contrasting the Scottish and French reforms, this article offers
a comparative standpoint for the analysis of criticism directed at Cadder and the
ensuing emergency legislation, and allows reflection on further reforms required
in both Scotland and France.
Resisting the right to legal advice
The 2010 Act in Scotland and the April 2011 legislation in France have broken
with a past of resistance to allowing suspects access to legal advice at the police
station. Lord Rodger’s historical analysis in Cadder reveals the extent of such
resistance in Scotland.21 Lord Rodger attached particular weight to the Thomson
Committee’s recommendation that a solicitor should not be permitted to participate
in police investigations before charge, since the main purpose of
interrogation—obtaining from the suspect any information that he might possess
regarding the offence—might otherwise be defeated.22 This recommendation was
turned into s.3 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980—later consolidated
into s.15 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995—which allowed for the
detention and questioning of suspects for up to six hours without access to a
solicitor. As Lord Rodger observed, s.15 was specifically designed to deprive
“the suspect of any right to take legal advice before being questioned by the
police, in the hope that, without it, he will be more likely to incriminate
himself during questioning”.23
This meant that “the rights of the detainee were to take second place to the public
interest”, added Lord Hope, also inCadder.24 The police could question the suspect
“without being deflected from their task by the presence of a solicitor”.25Section
15 survived challenges in Scottish courts26 until Salduz and Cadder finally led to
recognition, with the 2010 Act, of a right to legal advice.
Review of the historical development of custodial legal advice in France paints
a similar picture of systemic opposition to access to such advice. The police station
remained “almost completely closed to lawyers”27 until the beginning of the 90s,
when the Delmas-Marty Commission recommended that lawyers should be given
the right to be present during questioning.28 Legislation was then introduced, in
August 1993, giving suspects the right to consult with a lawyer, but only for thirty
ECHR’s Fair Trial Provisions and Scottish Criminal Procedure” [2011] Crim. L.R. 743. See also P.R. Ferguson and
F.E. Raitt, “A Clear and Coherent Package of Reforms? The Scottish Government Consultation Paper on the Carloway
Report” [2012] Crim. L.R. 909, which contains a brief analysis of the recommendations of the Carloway Report on
the provision of legal advice.
20White and Ferguson, “Sins of the Father? The ‘Sons of Cadder’” [2012] Crim. L.R. 357, 366.
21Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [74–92].
22Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [91].
23Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [91].
24Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [23].
25Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [23].
26 See Paton v Ritchie [2000] J.C. 271; 2000 S.L.T. 239; Dickson v HM Advocate [2001] J.C. 203; 2001 S.L.T.
674; HM Advocate v McLean [2009] HCJAC 97, 2010 S.L.T. 73.
27R. Vogler, “Reform Trends in Criminal Justice: Spain, France and England & Wales”, 4 Wash. U. Global Stud.
L. Rev. 631, 635 (2005).
28Commission justice pénale et droits de l’homme (Paris: La documentation française, 1991), p.113.
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minutes, twenty hours into the garde à vue.29 Not only this, but in a range of cases
deemed exceptional the suspect could not meet his lawyer until 36 hours or even
72 hours of garde à vue had elapsed.30 Then in June 2000 suspects were finally
given the right to consult with a lawyer at the beginning of the garde à vue.31 But
the exceptional garde à vue regime also remained in place. Further exceptions
were introduced32 until Salduz caused a true legal earthquake in France, with the
unexpected effect of statutory recognition of the right of suspects to be assisted
by a lawyer during questioning by the police.
From this historical snapshot, it becomes evident that Scotland and France have
strongly resisted lawyers entering the police station. In France, of course, since
the 2000 legislation suspects were entitled to meet with a lawyer at the beginning
of the garde à vue, whereas suspects in Scotland were until the 2010 reform
questioned without receiving any legal advice. But consultation in France could
not last for more than 30 minutes and did not apply until extremely late in the
process in a whole range of offences. Against the backdrop of such common
opposition to legal advice and assistance at the police station, it is intriguing to
observe the differences and similarities in the Scottish and French legislation that
now gives effect to such rights.
“Enter the police station”
The right to a private consultation
The 2010 Act gave suspects in Scotland the right to have a private consultation
with a solicitor before any questioning by the police begins and at any other time
during such questioning.33 In view of the pre-existing status quo, this was a radical
reform. But the French legislation of April 2011 went further. It provided suspects
with the right to be assisted by a lawyer from the beginning of the garde à vue,34
which means from the moment that the suspect is detained at the police station for
any investigative purposes required.35 This means that assistance is available
regardless of questioning.36 This is the position that the Carloway Review
recommends should now be adopted in Scotland.37 The Review stresses that this
29Loi n° 93-1013 du 24 août 1993 modifiant la loi n° 93-2 du 4 janvier 1993 portant réforme de la procédure
pénale. See art.63-4 CPP as amended by the Law of August 24, 1993.
30This applied to organised crime, terrorism and drug related offences. See art.63-4 CPP, as amended by the Law
of August 24, 1993.
31Loi n° 2000-516 du 15 juin 2000 renforçant la protection de la présomption d’innocence et les droits des victimes.
See art.63-4 CPP as amended by the Law of June 15, 2000.
32 See art.63-4 CPP, modified by the Law of March 9, 2004.
33Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s.15A, as inserted by Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention
and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 s.1(4).
34Article 63-3-1 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011 art.6.
35 See art.62-2 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011 art.2.
36More generally, the Law of April 2011 attempts to disconnect the garde à vue from questioning, defining it
(art.62-2 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011) as a coercive measure that allows the police to retain the
suspect at their disposal in order to achieve one of the strictly enumerated objectives, such as stop him from tampering
with evidence or to allow for the investigations that require his presence and participation. As Roujou de Boubée
notes, questioning can no longer be seen but as a secondary function of the garde à vue. G. Roujou de Boubée, “La
réforme de la garde à vue (commentaire de la loi n° 2011-392 du 14 avril 2011)”, Recueil Dalloz 2011, p.1570 at
p.1572.
37The Carloway Review, Report and Recommendations, p.167. See also Ferguson and Raitt, “AClear and Coherent
Package of Reforms?” [2012] Crim. L.R. 909, 913, who consider that the current solution “can be criticized on the
basis that the police can garner incriminating evidence from a suspect through other means”.
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would be consistent with ECHR jurisprudence38 and the proposed EU Directive
on the Right of Access to a Lawyer.39 The French example adds further support to
this recommendation.
On the other hand, French law offers very little protection to persons who are
not yet suspected of the commission of an offence and to those who may be
suspected but are voluntarily attending the police station. The former can be
questioned for four hours and have no right to have a consultation with a lawyer.40
The latter are also questioned without a lawyer, for as long as they decide to remain
at the police station. This is very problematic given that these are suspected persons
who would otherwise be subjected to a garde à vue, with the consequence of being
entitled to exercise the relevant procedural rights. Furthermore, the law does not
provide any guarantees that the suspects’ consent to questioning is genuinely free
and informed. In reality, suspects questioned in this way find themselves in a legal
limbo, reminiscent of the times when there was no access to a lawyer in the garde
à vue. And yet the Conseil constitutionnel has recently made a finding of
constitutionality regarding this practice.41 It did hold that once suspicion arises
from questioning, the suspect must be informed of the date and nature of the
suspected offence and of his right to leave the police station at any time. But the
court did not require that the suspect be informed of the right to legal advice.42
Thus, theConseil’s decision went against the tide of the recent progressive reforms
that, ironically, the Conseil had initiated itself.43 Here there is a clear difference
with Scotland, where persons attending voluntarily at a police station or other
place for the purpose of being questioned enjoy the same right to have access to
a solicitor as those who are detained at the police station.44
Attention must now be paid to what “assistance from the beginning of the garde
à vue” actually entails. It is, first of all, a right to consult with a lawyer, in conditions
that guarantee the confidentiality of the consultation between the lawyer and the
suspect.45 The Law of April 2011 changes nothing in this respect. The consultation
is still allowed for a maximum 30 minutes, while a second consultation, of the
same duration, can only take place when the garde à vue is extended beyond the
24-hour time limit.46 Private consultation is therefore strictly regulated. Suspects
are entitled to two 30-minute consultations in 48 hours of interrogation. The Scottish
legislation, on the other hand, does not regulate the duration and frequency of
consultations. The suspect has the right to have a private consultation prior to and
at any point during questioning. Taken at face value, the provision is “simple
enough”,47 but one might imagine situations where its flexibility could create
38Dayanan v Turkey, 7377/ 03 (ECtHR, October 13, 2009) at [32].
39EU Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to communicate upon
arrest, COM (2011) 326, 8/6/2011, art.4. For the revised text, see Council of the European Union 7337/12, March 9,
2012.
40Article 62 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011 art.14.
41 See H. Matsopoulou, “Les dispositions de la loi du 14 avril 2011 sur la garde à vue déclarées conformes à la
Constitution”, Recueil Dalloz 2011, p.3035. See also O. Bachelet, “Admission, sous réserve, de l’audition libre dans
l’enquête préliminaire”, in Lettre ‘Actualités Droits-Libertés’ du CREDOF, 11 juillet 2012.
42Conseil constitutionnel, Décision n° 2011-191/194/195/196/197-QPC du 18 novembre 2011, considérant 20.
43E. Vergès, “Garde à vue: le rôle de l’avocat au cœur d’un conflit de normes nationales et européennes”, Recueil
Dalloz 2011, p.3005.
44Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s.15A, as inserted by Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention
and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 s.1(4).
45Article 63-4 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011 art.7.
46Article 63-4 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011 art.7.
47 F. Stark, “The Consequences of Cadder” (2011) 15 Edin. L.R. 293, 295.
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practical problems, for instance if a suspect kept making new requests for private
consultations or if he complained about the short duration of such consultations.
The French solution alleviates such risks. It is a separate issue that two 30-minute
consultations in 48 hours of interrogations can hardly allow for effective legal
assistance.48 Viewed from Scotland, the French solution might seem as too
restrictive of suspects’ opportunity to meet with their lawyer. Nonetheless the
crucial question is how the Scottish rule will be applied in practice. There is
currently too much scope for the abuse of the right to consultation, either on the
part of the suspect or the police.
The right to have a lawyer present when questioned by the police
This brings us to the issue of suspects having their lawyer present during, as
opposed to before or between, questioning by the police. The issue was barely
touched upon in Cadder and the subsequent Scottish reform, whereas in France it
was at the very centre of the debate on the garde à vue. France was already
recognising the right to a private consultation from the beginning of the garde à
vue, yet its regime of custodial legal assistance was found to be in breach of the
right to fair trial in Brusco, where the ECtHR held that “a person subjected to a
garde à vue has the right to be assisted by a lawyer from the beginning of this
measure as well as during questioning”.49Assistance has to be effective; the lawyer
must be allowed to play his role fully. This was Strasbourg’s message in Brusco,
according to Renucci.50 An opportunity merely to consult with the suspect for a
brief period of time, restricting the lawyer to providing the suspect with emotional
support and informing him of his procedural rights, was no longer consistent with
the ECHR.51 The Conseil constitutionnel had already pointed in that direction,52
then, only a few days afterBrusco, theCour de cassation provided full confirmation
that for fair trial requirements to be satisfied, the suspect must not be questioned
in the absence of his lawyer.53 This jurisprudence was quickly integrated into the
Bill that became the Law of April 2011, which now gives any person subjected to
a garde à vue the right to “ask that the lawyer assists him during questioning”.54
This was the most highly anticipated reform introduced with the new legislation.55
By way of contrast, the Scottish 2010 Act introduced a right to consultation prior
to and during questioning, but not a right to have a lawyer present at the time when
questioned by the police. This does not mean that a request for legal assistance
during questioning would be necessarily denied,56 but there is nothing in the 2010
Act obliging the police to provide the suspect with such assistance either.
The divide between Scotland and France on this point becomes even wider if
one also takes into consideration that the Scottish Act does not require that a lawyer
48The lack of legal assistance other than in these two consultations has indeed been found to be incompatible with
art.6 ECHR and the French Constitution. Brusco v France (1466/07) (ECtHR, October 19, 2010) at [45].
49Emphasis added. Brusco v France (1466/07) (ECtHR, October 19, 2010) at [45].
50 J.-F. Renucci, “Garde à vue et CEDH: la France condamnée à Strasbourg”, Recueil Dalloz 2010, p.2950.
51 See J.-F. Renucci, “L’avocat et la garde à vue: exigences européennes et réalités nationales”, Recueil Dalloz
2009, p.2897.
52Conseil constitutionnel, Décision n° 2010-14/22 QPC du 30 juillet 2010 at [28].
53Crim. 19 octobre 2010, Bull. Crim. 163.
54Art. 63-4-2 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011 art.8.
55G. Roujou de Boubée, “La réforme de la garde à vue”, Recueil Dalloz 2011, p.1570 at p.1573.
56 J. Chalmers and F. Leverick, “‘Substantial and Radical Change’: A NewDawn for Scottish Criminal Procedure?”
(2012) 75(5) M.L.R. 837, 846.
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physically attends the police station;57 “the right is merely to a consultation”,58 and
this “does not have to occur face to face”.59 “Consultation” is defined by the 2010
Act as “consultation by such means as may be appropriate in the circumstances,
and includes, for example, consultation by means of telephone”.60 This must also
be seen in the context of current practice in Scotland, where legal advice is often
given over the phone.61 The Carloway Review seems to have placed equally little
emphasis on the need for the lawyer’s personal attendance at the police station,
underlining that, in many cases, legal advice could be given much more quickly
and more effectively by telephone call or over an internet video link.62 On the
contrary, in France, there is no reference to telephone consultation in the relevant
legislation and no apparent reliance on it in practice, while the issue has been
ignored in debates around the reform of the garde à vue.
One issue that has been the main cause of concern in France—the questioning
of the suspect in the absence of a lawyer—has received virtually no attention in
Scotland, despite the fact that both countries changed their legislation in response
to the same Strasbourg jurisprudence. Perhaps the fact that France had already
recognised a (limited) right to consultation meant that the ground was fertile for
a more radical incorporation of the right to effective legal assistance. In any case,
the French solution provides a useful prism for exploration of further reforms that
might be required in Scotland. It is abundantly clear, anyway, that in the context
of the French reform the role of custodial legal assistance has been construed more
widely than that in Scotland. Leverick’s distinction between a right to legal advice
and a right to legal assistance quite accurately reflects the divergent Scottish and
French approaches63; by the simple fact of being entitled to be present during
questioning, lawyers in France are now being expected to play a more important
role in the garde à vue than simply advising the suspect.
The role of the lawyer during custodial interrogation
Developing this point further, it is instructive to look at a report published by the
Conseil national des barreaux (National Council of Bar Associations) shortly after
the Law of April 2011 came into force. The report sees the first mission of the
lawyer as verifying the legality of the garde à vue and checking material conditions
at the police station. Then the lawyer has the fundamental role of making sure that
the suspect exercises his rights. In the confidential one-to-one consultation, the
lawyer must discuss with the suspect his treatment by the police and inform him
of the various stages of the process as well as his procedural rights. During
questioning, the lawyer can remind the suspect of his right to remain silent, ask
the police to reformulate questions that the suspect may not understand and ensure
57 Stark, “The Consequences of Cadder” (2011) 15 Edin. L.R. 293, 295.
58 F. Leverick, “The Right to Legal Assistance During Detention” (2011) 15 Edin. L.R. 352, 360.
59Leverick, “The Right to Legal Assistance During Detention” (2011) 15 Edin. L.R. 352, 360.
60Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s.15A(5), as inserted by Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention
and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 s.1(4).
61 P.R. Ferguson, “Repercussions of the Cadder Case” [2011] Crim. L.R. 743, 754, citing P. Nicholson, “Rights
Under Question” (2010) J.L.S.S. 12.
62The Carloway Review, Report and Recommendations, para.6.1.40. Ferguson and Raitt question whether continuing
with the norm of telephone advice in all but the most serious cases is consistent with recent ECHR jurisprudence and
the proposed EU Directive on the Right of Access to a Lawyer. Ferguson and Raitt, “A Clear and Coherent Package
of Reforms?” [2012] Crim. L.R. 909, 914.
63Leverick, “The Right to Legal Assistance During Detention” (2011) 15 Edin. L.R. 352, 354.
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that the police have made an accurate record of statements made by the suspect.64
Thus conceived, the role of the lawyer in police stations in France is much more
extensive than the role of the lawyer in police interrogations in Scotland. As regards
the role of the lawyer during questioning, however, it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that the report engages in “wishful thinking”. The Law of April 2011
allows the lawyer to be present during the interview, but forbids him from asking
any questions before the police have finished interviewing the suspect.65 It also
gives the police the right to block the lawyer from asking any questions even at
the end of the interview, if the questions are seen as potentially damaging for the
investigation.66 The police are also entitled to put an immediate end to the interview,
at any time, for the ambiguous reason of facing a difficulty, in which case they
can ask the president of the local bar association to designate another lawyer.67 It
remains to be seen how widely the power to exclude the lawyer from questioning
will be exercised in practice, but there is no denying that it subjects the lawyer to
the constant threat of being evicted from the process if he does not “behave”. So
the lawyer is only allowed to take notes during the interview and submit written
observations in the end, which can be addressed to the prosecutor who supervises
the garde à vue.68 The lawyer’s role is therefore anything but adversarial. As Vergès
eloquently put it:
“The 2011 legislationmademanifest a real suspicion towards the lawyer who
assists in the garde à vue. Far from exercising an active defence role, the
lawyer is confined to being an audience member”.69
So despite the recent reforms provoked by Strasbourg, the French system of
custodial interrogation has still not achieved full harmony with ECHR
jurisprudence.70 According to Dayanan v Turkey, a suspect should be able to
“obtain the whole range of services specifically associated with legal
assistance. In this regard, counsel has to be able to secure without restriction
the fundamental aspects of that person’s defence: discussion of the case,
organisation of the defence, collection of evidence favourable to the accused,
preparation for questioning, support of an accused in distress and checking
of the conditions of detention.”71
This means that the lawyer must be able to organise the suspect’s defence freely,
playing an active role throughout the garde à vue,72 which is currently not the case
in France given the restrictions applying to the lawyer’s participation in questioning.
But by the same token it can be said that by giving the suspect access to legal
64Conseil national des barreaux, Assemblée générale des 8 et 9 juillet 2011, Première définition du rôle de l’avocat
pendant la garde à vue, available at http://cnb.avocat.fr/Role-de-l-avocat-intervenant-pendant-la-garde-a-vue-premiere
-definition-en-forme-de-vade-mecum-a-l-usage-de-la_a1102.html [Accessed February 20, 2013], pp.4–12.
65Article 63-4-3 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011 art.8.
66Article 63-4-3 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011 art.8.
67Article 63-4-3 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011 art.8.
68Article 63-4-3 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011 art.8.
69E. Vergès, “Garde à vue: le rôle de l’avocat au cœur d’un conflit de normes nationales et européennes”, Recueil
Dalloz 2011, p.3005.
70 See H. Matsopoulou, “Les dispositions de la loi du 14 avril 2011 sur la garde à vue déclarées conformes à la
Constitution”, Recueil Dalloz 2011, p.3035.
71Dayanan v Turkey (7377/03) (ECtHR, October 13, 2009), para.32.
72H. Matsopoulou, “Les dispositions de la loi du 14 avril 2011 sur la garde à vue déclarées conformes à la
Constitution”, Recueil Dalloz 2011, p.3035 at p.3038.
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advice from the beginning of the garde à vue and by allowing him to be assisted
by a lawyer during questioning, though clearly not in adversarial terms, French
law now goes some way towards allowing the suspect to obtain “the whole range
of services associated with legal assistance”,73 and towards convergence with the
proposed EUDirective on the Right of Access to a Lawyer, which defines “access”
as entailing the presence and participation of the lawyer in official interviews.74
The same is not necessarily true of Scottish law. The new regime may or may not
prove consistent withDayanan and the proposed EUDirective, depending on how
the police treat suspects’ requests to be assisted by a lawyer during questioning in
practice.
These observations are of topical interest in view of the fact that the Carloway
Review was of the opinion that the role of the lawyer in providing advice does not
need to be set in legislation.75 However, this leaves too much to be determined by
the way the police decide to exercise their discretion. The example of the French
experience provides a useful contrast of a clearer framework for custodial legal
assistance. Then again, what the French legislator gave with one hand—the right
to be present during the questioning of the suspect—he took away with the other,
by restricting the lawyer to a passive role during questioning.
Delaying questioning to allow access to legal advice
Once a suspect in France has asked that a lawyer assist him in interrogations,
questioning cannot be initiated, in the absence of a court-appointed lawyer or a
lawyer appointed by the suspect, before the expiry of a period of two hours. In
cases where the lawyer arrives after the two hours have elapsed, the questioning
has to cease, if the suspect makes such a request, to allow for a 30-minute private
consultation with the lawyer.76 Contrarily, there is no fixed rule in Scottish law on
how long the police must wait for the suspect to receive advice or for the lawyer
to arrive at the police station, and on whether they can start questioning the suspect
in the absence of the lawyer after a certain period of time. The 2010 Act said
nothing on the topic. The Carloway Review considered that a period of one hour
would be reasonable in urban areas and two hours would be acceptable in rural
areas. However, it approved of the current flexible approach, noting that no
legislation is required and advocating consideration of various factors such as
distance, availability of transport and prevailing weather conditions.77 Again, this
approach leaves toomuch to be determined by the way the police decide to exercise
their power to initiate the interrogation of the suspect. It also creates the risk that
different trial judges will come to different conclusions as to whether the police
have waited for the period of time reasonably required before questioning the
suspect, which might create inconsistency at the level of admissibility of any
confessional evidence obtained thereby.
73Dayanan v Turkey (7377/03) (ECtHR, October 13, 2009), para.32.
74EU Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the right to communicate upon
arrest, COM (2011) 326, 8/6/2011, art.3.
75 The Carloway Review, Report and Recommendations, para.6.1.35.
76Article 63-4-2 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011, art.8.
77 The Carloway Review, Report and Recommendations, paras 6.1.29–6.1.32.
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Withholding access to legal advice
In exceptional cases, questioning can start in the absence of the appointed lawyer
in both Scotland and France. In France, the two-hour time limit does not apply
when the necessities of the investigation require that the suspect be questioned
immediately.78 Not only this, there is also the power to defer the presence of the
lawyer at questioning for 12 hours and, in more serious cases, for a whole 24 hours,
in order to collect or preserve evidence, or in order to prevent an imminent attack
upon other persons.79 In Scotland, in exceptional circumstances, the questioning
can begin or continue without the suspect having had a private consultation with
a solicitor, so far as it is necessary in the interest of the investigation or the
prevention of crime or the apprehension of offenders.80 The Carloway Review
considered that there is no need for a statutory definition here.81 When Lord
Carloway appeared before the Justice Committee in the Scottish Parliament, he
explained that “exceptional” meant “very rare”, “extreme” circumstances, not
applying to “run-of-the-mill cases”.82He admitted that the police or the prosecution
might in some cases try to argue that there were exceptional circumstances, but
offered a prognosis that “the courts will be pretty firm in this area”.83 A constable
may also delay intimation of detention to a solicitor, for the same reasons that
justify initiating questioning without prior consultation.84 In brief, in both countries
there is a risk that the right will be undermined in practice, mainly as a result of
the vague and subjective nature of the rules allowing the police to withhold access
to legal advice. By providing for a restriction of this right for up to 24 hours in
some cases, France, in particular, goes too far in prioritising the interests of the
police.
The comparison of the legislative reforms in Scotland and France raises a number
of interesting questions about the scope of the right to legal assistance generally.
Valuable lessons can be learned from such comparison, especially at a time when
the Scottish government is planning to introduce new legislation, following the
Carloway Review and consultation, and when there are renewed calls in France
for amendments to the April 2011 legislation in order to bring the garde à vue
closer to the European paradigm.85 In addition to pinpointing specific legal reforms,
comparative analysis also allows for some more general observations on the issue
of recognition of the right to custodial legal assistance.
78 In this case the police need to get written authorisation from the procureur de la République. See art.63-4-2 CPP,
as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011, art.8.
79Article 63-4-2 CPP, as inserted by the Law of April 14, 2011, art.8.
80Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s.15A(7)(b), as inserted by Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance,
Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 s.1(4).
81 The Carloway Review, Report and Recommendations, para.6.1.33.
82The Scottish Parliament, Justice Committee, Carloway Review, November 29, 2011, p.548.
83The Scottish Parliament, Justice Committee, Carloway Review, November 29, 2011, p.549.
84See Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s.15A(7)(b), as inserted by Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance,
Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 s.1(4).
85 J. Alix, “Les droits de la défense au cours de l’enquête de police après la réforme de la garde à vue: état de lieux
et perspectives”, Recueil Dalloz 2011, p.1699; H. Matsopoulou, “Les dispositions de la loi du 14 avril 2011 sur la
garde à vue déclarées conformes à la Constitution”, Recueil Dalloz 2011, p.3035 at p.3036.
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Criticism of Cadder revisited
A recent Criminal Law Review article offering an analysis of the “repercussions”
of Cadder made four criticisms in relation to recognition of the right to legal
assistance in this case.86 These will now be revisited in the light of similar judicial
and legislative developments in France leading to recognition of the right to legal
assistance there.
The first criticism was that the Supreme Court had read Salduz too widely, by
not treating “a right to legal advice as part of the more general right against
compelled self-incrimination”.87 The Supreme Court was perfectly clear on this
point. “The emphasis” in Salduz was on “the presence of a lawyer as a necessary
safeguard to ensure respect for the right of the detainee not to incriminate himself”,88
and not on the elimination of “the risk of ill-treatment or other forms of physical
or psychological pressure as a means of coercing the detainee to incriminate
himself”.89 This interpretation finds support in the jurisprudence of the French
Cour de cassation, according to which art.6 required not just the presence of the
lawyer and consultation with the suspect, but legal “assistance in conditions
allowing the lawyer to organise the defence of the suspect and prepare him for the
interrogations”90 in which the lawyer must be able to participate.91 The Cour de
cassation adopted a reading of art.6 that went beyond Salduz to mirror Dayanan,
in finding that the suspect should obtain the “whole range of services specifically
associated with legal assistance”.92 In other words, the court defined the scope of
the right to legal advice as extending far beyond protection of the right against
compelled self-incrimination; notifying the suspect of his right to silence and
helping himmake informed choices about how to exercise it is an important aspect
of custodial legal assistance, but so is helping the suspect enforce his rights.93 From
this point of view, the argument that Cadder interpreted ECHR jurisprudence too
broadly loses force. The Supreme Court’s interpretation seems relatively narrow
in comparison to that adopted by theCour de cassation. This observation becomes
even more interesting if one accepts White’s and Ferguson’s argument that in the
“sons of Cadder” cases the Supreme Court retreated from the broader position it
had adopted in Cadder in relation to the right against self-incrimination.94
The second criticism followed from the first. The argument was that if it is
accepted that the right to legal assistance is derived from the right against compelled
self-incrimination—rather than the right against self-incrimination—then it also
has to be accepted that access to a lawyer may be seen as a desirable safeguard
but not necessarily as a mandatory one.95 The right against compelled
86 Ferguson, “Repercussions of the Cadder Case” [2011] Crim. L.R. 743.
87White and Ferguson, “Sins of the Father? The ‘Sons of Cadder’” [2012] Crim. L.R. 357, 358, summarising the
argument made in the earlier article.
88Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [35].
89Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [34].
90Crim. 19 octobre 2010, Bull. crim. 163, pp.674–675.
91Communiqué, Chambre criminelle, arrêts 19 octobre 2010, available at http://www.courdecassation.fr
/jurisprudence_2/chambre_criminelle_578/arrets_rendus_17837.html [Accessed February 20, 2012].
92Crim. 19 octobre 2010, Bull. crim. 163, p.674.
93See E. Gindre, “Une révolution jurisprudentielle en trompe l’œil: les décisions de non conventionalité des régimes
de garde à vue au regard des droits de la défense”, RSC 2010, p.879, at pp.884–889. For analysis of these different
aspects of the right to legal assistance see Leverick, “The Right to Legal Assistance During Detention” (2011) 15
Edin. L.R. 352, 365–371.
94White and Ferguson, “Sins of the Father? The ‘Sons of Cadder’” [2012] Crim. L.R. 357.
95 Ferguson, “Repercussions of the Cadder Case” [2011] Crim. L.R. 743, 751.
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self-incrimination can be protected in other ways, as observed by the High Court
of Justiciary inMcLean, if “other safeguards to secure a fair trial … are in place”,
notwithstanding that a lawyer is not provided during custodial interrogation.96 As
specified in McLean, the safeguards otherwise available in Scottish criminal
procedure included the right of the suspect to be cautioned of the right to silence;
the right to intimation of detention to a solicitor; the fact that no questioning is
allowed after caution and charge; the audio and video recording of the interview
in serious cases; the prohibition of coercion and unfair treatment as well as the
fact that evidence thus obtained will be rendered inadmissible; the existence of an
absolute right to silence and lack of adverse inferences, the corroboration
requirement and the fact that a person may not be detained for more than six hours
from the moment of detention.97 Now, in Cadder, the Supreme Court recognised
that if access to legal assistance, as understood in Salduz, was about protecting the
right against compelled self-incrimination, then “it might have been thought that
the use of techniques such as tape-recording would meet the need to monitor the
need for fairness”, but since Salduz’s emphasis was on the right against
self-incrimination, then there was no possibility of resorting to such analysis.98
“The guarantees otherwise available [were] entirely commendable”,99 but, at the
same time, “beside the point”.100
At this point we can draw an analogy with recognition of the right to legal
assistance in France, where “the extended availability of custodial legal advice
[had] been rejected as unnecessary [in the past] on the grounds that the existing
system of judicial supervision [provided] adequate protection”.101 In fact, at the
time of recognition of the right to legal assistance in France, French criminal
procedure provided at least as complete a system of “guarantees otherwise
available” as Scottish criminal procedure: the right to intimation of detention; the
audiovisual recording of interviews in serious cases; the prohibition of coercion
and unfair treatment; an absolute right to silence and the absence of a power to
draw adverse inferences from its exercise as well as the existence of procedural
nullities invalidating acts that breach rights applying at the garde à vue, which is
the Continental law equivalent of excluding confessional evidence obtained in
violation of the rights of the suspect.102Of course, French criminal procedure lacked
96HM Advocate v McLean [2009] HCJAC 97, 2010 S.L.T. 73 at [31].
97HM Advocate v McLean [2009] HCJAC 97, 2010 S.L.T. 73 at [27].
98Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [34].
99Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [50].
100Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [66].
101 J. Hodgson, French Criminal Justice—A Comparative Account of the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime
in France (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005), p.151.
102The last point about exclusion is an important one, especially if one takes into account the jurisprudence that
the Cour de cassation has developed since the beginning of the 90s, which has progressively replaced the power to
exercise judicial discretion in this area with automatic “exclusion”. Put differently, in comparison to Scotland’s system
of discretionary exclusion, exclusion for certain violations of the garde à vue has long been automatic in France,
which can be seen as another important “guarantee otherwise available” of procedural fairness. On the automatic
procedural nullities in France see generally B. Bouloc, “Observations sur les nullités en matière de procédure pénale”
in Mélanges offerts à Pierre Couvrat, La sanction du droit, PUF, Paris (2001), p.417; A. Decocq, J. Montrevil et J.
Buisson, Le droit de la police, 2ème éd., Litec (1998), p.818; P. Delage, “La sanction des nullités de la garde à vue
: de la sanction juridictionnelle à la sanction parquetière”, Archives de politique criminelle 2006, p.137; E. Molina,
La liberté de preuve des infractions en droit français contemporain, Presses Univérsitaires d’Aix-Marseille,
Aix-en-Provence (2001); J. Pradel, “Nullité d’une procédure pour défaut d’enregistrement de l’interrogatoire d’un
mineur en garde à vue ”, D. 2007, p. 2141. For examples of the automatic nullities jurisprudence see Crim. 29 février
2000, Bull. crim. nº 93, Dr.pénal, juin 2000, nº 80, (2000) 3 Poiniki Dikeosini 861, comment D. Giannoulopoulos
(in Greek); Crim 20 mars 2007, Bull. crim. nº 85; Crim. 3 avril 2007, Bull. crim. nº 104; Crim. 24 juin 2009, Bull.
crim. nº 136; Crim. 3 mars 2010, Bull. crim. nº 47. On discretionary exclusion in Scotland see generally F. Stark and
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some of the fair trial guarantees applying at police stations in Scotland, notably
the duty to notify suspects of their right to silence, the corroboration requirement
and prohibition of post caution and charge questioning, and not allowing for long
periods of detention. But, on the other hand, France was giving suspects some
access to legal advice—the two 30-minute private consultations—and entrusted
the prosecutor with judicial supervision of the process. This was a fortiori the case
in interrogations carried out by the investigating judge (Juge d’instruction), where
the suspect has always been able to exercise a much wider range of defence rights,
including being assisted by a lawyer during questioning. And yet, these fair trial
guarantees were not given any consideration in the Conseil constitutionnel and
Cour de cassation jurisprudence recognising the right to legal assistance. It can
be assumed that, in the light of Salduz, they were seen as “beside the point”. This
is particularly significant if we consider that French pre-trial procedure is strongly
rooted in the inquisitorial tradition103 and that recognition of the right to legal
assistance has been strongly resisted in the past. To put it differently, against the
backdrop of inquisitorialism and resistance, one might expect the “guarantees
otherwise available” argument to resonate well with those opposed to recognition
of the right to legal assistance, and yet no one seemed to consider that the ECtHR’s
jurisprudence could be bypassed in this way.
A third criticism was that “the unintended legacy of Cadder may be the
dismantling of key protections for accused persons within the Scottish system of
criminal procedure”.104 Ferguson pinpointed that suspects’ liberty had already been
curtailed, with a doubling of the permissible period of detention. She predicted a
likely loss of the Scottish caution and corroboration requirement, and the
introduction of a power to draw adverse inferences.105 Leverick has expressed
similar concerns regarding the drawing of adverse inferences,106 while Raitt saw
potential reforms as an attempt to “re-balance” the system, giving the impression
of a quid pro quo.107 The Carloway Review proved such concerns right with respect
to corroboration,108 but rejected the possibility of drawing adverse inferences from
silence.109 Interestingly, a quid pro quo response to recognition of the right to legal
assistance cannot be traced in France, despite the fact that France went further than
Scotland in legislating for a right to have a lawyer present during questioning and
despite the inquisitorial culture pervading French pre-trial proceedings. Recent
validation by the Conseil constitutionnel of the practice of depriving suspects
voluntarily attending the police station of the right to legal assistance is, of course,
highly indicative of an effort to minimise the effect of the application of such a
right. The same can be said of the wide powers to delay or withhold exercise of
the right as well as of the passive role prescribed for lawyers during questioning.
But reactions to recognition of the right to legal assistance have not gone so far as
to trigger legislation that would remove guarantees otherwise available. So, if
F. Leverick, “Scotland: A Plea for Consistency” in S.C. Thaman (ed.), Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law
(Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer, 2013) 69.
103See generally J. Hodgson, “The Role of the Criminal Defence Lawyer in an Inquisitorial Procedure: Legal and
Ethical Constraints” (2006) 9 Legal Ethics 125.
104 Ferguson, “Repercussions of the Cadder Case” [2011] Crim. L.R. 743, 756.
105 Ferguson, “Repercussions of the Cadder Case” [2011] Crim. L.R. 743, 756.
106 F. Leverick, “The Supreme Court Strikes Back” (2011) 15 Edin. L.R. 287, 292.
107 F.E. Raitt, “The Carloway Review: An Opportunity Lost” (2011) 15 Edin. L.R. 427, 430.
108 The Carloway Review, Report and Recommendations, pp.255–286.
109 The Carloway Review, Report and Recommendations, pp.315–328.
Custodial Legal Assistance Reforms in Scotland and France 381
[2013] Crim. L.R., Issue 5 © 2013 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited
France has managed to absorb the effects of recognition of the right to legal
assistance without introducing legislation taking away other procedural guarantees,
why is this not conceivable in Scotland? In any case, it is submitted that the quid
pro quo argument must be seen as criticism of the Government for its knee-jerk
reaction to ECtHR enhancement of suspects’ rights and not as criticism of the
jurisprudence that has caused such a reaction.
Finally, Cadder was criticised for treating ECHR jurisprudence as a means of
homogenisation rather than harmonisation of European criminal procedures.110
From a different angle, however, this criticism can be seen as a defence of
pre-Cadder isolationism of Scottish criminal procedure; the isolationism that Lord
Hope took issue with, by noting that it was remarkable that, until quite recently,
nobody thought there was anything wrong with the procedure of interviewing
suspects without access to legal advice.111 It took the Supreme Court’s cosmopolitan
approach in Cadder to break with such isolationism.112 France had long adopted a
similarly idiosyncratic position in this area.113 As in the UKwithCadder, here also
it was the judiciary’s cosmopolitanism that opened up new horizons for suspects’
rights in custodial interrogation. Space precludes a discussion of the benefits of
such cosmopolitan legal vision. But it needs stressing that had it not been for such
vision, both Scotland and France would most probably still be out of tune with
current thinking in Europe. Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court has been
in good company in giving effect to ECHR jurisprudence adds in itself support to
adopting such an approach. The dilemmas that Scottish courts were facing— such
as that “there are limits to harmonization”114 and that Strasbourg should “not dictate
howMember States should conduct their criminal procedures, so long as, ultimately,
each trial/ process is a fair one”115—were no less present for French courts, yet this
did not preclude the latter from giving effect to ECHR jurisprudence. For the sake
of completeness, it can be mentioned here that the same thing happened to different
degrees in Belgium and the Netherlands.116 In other words, ECHR jurisprudence
was applied with more or less the same force in the majority of member states
which prior to Salduz did not afford a right to legal assistance at interview.117
Conclusions and lessons for England and Wales
This article has put into comparative perspective the recent reforms of custodial
legal assistance in Scotland and France. From this perspective, it may be possible
to obtain a new understanding of the nature and scope of the procedural rights
introduced with these reforms. For example, recognition in Scotland of a right to
110 Ferguson, “Repercussions of the Cadder Case” [2011] Crim. L.R. 743, 754.
111Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [66].
112 See E. Bjorge, “Exceptionalism and Internationalism in the Supreme Court: Horncastle and Cadder” [2011]
P.L. 475. For a discussion of legal cosmopolitanism see P. Roberts, “Rethinking the Law of Evidence: a Twenty-First
Century Agenda for Teaching and Research” in P. Roberts and M. Redmayne (eds), Innovations in Evidence and
Proof: Integrating Theory, Research and Proof (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), p.19.
113 See generally my article on “Custodial Legal Assistance and Notification of the Right to Silence in France:
Legal Cosmopolitanism and Local Resistance” (2013) 24 Criminal Law Forum (forthcoming).
114 Ferguson, “Repercussions of the Cadder Case” [2011] Crim. L.R. 743, 755.
115 Ferguson, “Repercussions of the Cadder Case” [2011] Crim. L.R. 743, 755.
116On the Dutch reform see Supreme Court of the Netherlands, LJN BH3079, June 30, 2009; C. Brants, “The
Reluctant Dutch Response to Salduz” (2011) 15 Edin. L.R. 298. On Belgium see Loi du 13 août 2011 available at
http://www.etaamb.be/fr/loi-du-13-aout-2011_n2011009606.html [Accessed February 20, 2013].
117 See Cadder [2010] UKSC 43 at [49].
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consultation may now appear as less radical a reform than originally considered,
if contrasted with enactment in France of a right to have a lawyer present during
questioning. To take another example, the flaws of the French practice of depriving
suspects voluntarily attending the police station of legal assistance may become
more evident through a comparison with the Scottish rule that treats detained
suspects and those voluntarily attending the police station alike. The article has
also demonstrated that the Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to legal
assistance in Cadder was a justified response to ECHR jurisprudence, similar to
that given by the Conseil constitutionnel and Cour de cassation in France, and
that such recognition did not necessarily have to lead to quid pro quo reforms,
dismantling key procedural guarantees; there was no evidence of such a trend in
France. Finally, drawing an analogy with the French judiciary’s response to Salduz,
the article has argued thatCadder could be conceived as cosmopolitan jurisprudence
breaking with Scottish isolationism in the field of police interrogation rather than
the effect of a homogenisation agenda pushed forward by Strasbourg.
These comparisons are also of particular significance for England and Wales.
On the one hand, they serve as a useful reminder of the radical character of the
reforms introduced with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), this
“landmark statute in the development of the criminal justice system”.118With PACE
the right to legal consultation and right to have a lawyer present during questioning
were implemented in England and Wales nearly 25 years prior to them being
enacted into Scottish and French law respectively. Not only this, the Scottish and
French reforms were met with considerable resistance, despite being long overdue.
In fact, resistance led to substantial restrictions of the scope of the newly introduced
rights in France, while it triggered consideration of reforms aimed at undermining
other key rights of the defendant in Scotland. In other words, nearly 25 years after
PACE, Scotland and France are still playing catch up with England and Wales in
terms of fully recognising a right to custodial legal assistance. Of course, on the
other hand, English law has since 1984 taken big steps backwards and away from
the due process position it had adopted with PACE. A gradually increasing reliance
on assigning custodial legal assistance to non-solicitor staff119 and restricting
opportunities for face-to-face consultation with legal counsel,120 coupled with an
ever-shrinking legal aid budget121 and the use of a full-blown system of adverse
inferences impacting upon lawyers’ ability to adopt an adversarial approach to
police interrogation,122 perfectly illustrate this point. It is therefore arguable that
just as Scotland and France are finally coming to terms with the need to provide
suspects with effective legal assistance, England andWales, a significant innovator
in this area at a European and possibly global level, are backtracking on their due
process commitments. This observation can in itself serve as a warning to England
118 I. Dennis, “Editorial—Legal Advice in Police Stations: 25 Years on” [2011] Crim. L.R. 1.
119See J. Hodgson and L. Bridges, “Improving Custodial Legal Advice” [1995] Crim. L.R. 101, 102; R. Pattenden
and L. Skinns, “Choice, Privacy and Publicly Funded Legal Advice at Police Stations” (2010) 73 M.L.R. 349, 352.
120 See L. Bridges and E. Cape, CDS Direct: Flying in the Face of the Evidence (London: Centre for Crime and
Justice Studies, King’s College, 2008); P. Pleasence, V. Kemp and N. Balmer, “The Justice Lottery? Police Station
Advice 25 years on from PACE” [2011] Crim. L.R. 6.
121 See A. Edwards, “Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—the Financial Procedural
and Practical Implications” [2012] Crim. L.R. 584.
122 See E. Cape, “The Rise (and Fall?) of a Criminal Defence Profession” [2004] Crim. L.R. 401, 414.
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andWales of the course they may be taking away from Europe, ironically at a time
when we might be observing a coming together of suspects’ rights in Europe.123
A Brief Rejoinder
This article offers useful insights into the French system.We are less familiar with
that system than is the author, but it seems that until relatively recently it lacked
a number of important safeguards. As the author explains, not only was there no
legal assistance for suspects during police questioning, but they were not advised
that they had a right not to respond to such questioning. Suspects could be detained
and questioned for 36 hours, and sometimes for 72 hours. This is in marked contrast
to the pre-Cadder Scottish detention period of six hours, with the maximum
permitted extension being for a further six hours; suspects having to be told of
their “right to silence” (on pain of inadmissibility), and of their right to inform a
third party of their detention. The article also tells us that in France “persons who
are not yet suspected of the commission of an offence ... can be questioned for
four hours”. Presumably such persons are (at least at this stage) potential witnesses.
Again, this is in contrast to the Scottish position in which witnesses are required
to provide the police with certain details (e.g. name, address, nationality) but cannot
be detained for questioning. If European harmonisationmeans that Scottish pre-trial
procedure becomes more like the French system, our worst fears will have been
realised.
We are also unconvinced that the quid pro quo argument must be seen as a criticism
of government, rather than of ECtHR jurisprudence. It is essential that those who
commit crimes can be prosecuted and ultimately convicted. If a systemmakes this
too difficult to achieve, it is a failure of justice. Given the large number of
prosecutions which have had to be abandoned in Scotland as a result of Cadder,
it was inevitable that the system would require to be “re-balanced” in favour of
the public interest and/or victims. The concern is that in an attempt at re-balancing,
adjustments such as the abolition of corroboration will go too far in the other
direction, making suspects far more likely to suffer miscarriages of justice.
Pamela R. Ferguson and Robin White
123 See A. Dorange and S. Field, “Reforming Defence Rights in French Police Custody: A Coming Together in
Europe?” (2012) 16 E. & P. 153.
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